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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Shuttle Discovery was launched into a 57-degree inclination orbit from the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Complex 39A at 7:11 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time
(EDT) on September 12, 1991. STS-48 was the second mission since return-to-flight to
have KSC as the planned end-of-mission landing site, and the first mission to have a
planned night landing at KSC. However, due to weather conditions at KSC in Florida,
Discovery flew one extra orbit and landed at Edwards Air Force Base, California, at
3:38 a.m. EDT on September 18, 1991.
Operation of all systems was generally satisfactory during the 5-day mission. On
Flight Day 3, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) was deployed from
Discovery's payload bay 350 statute miles above Earth. This orbiting observatory will
study mankind's effects on the planet's atmosphere and its shielding ozone layer. The
UARS mission objectives are to provide an increased understanding of the energy input
into the upper atmosphere, global photochemistry of the upper atmosphere, dynamics of
the upper atmosphere, the coupling among these processes, and the coupling between
the upper and lower atmosphere. This will provide important scientific data on the
Earth's middle atmosphere - that slice of air between 10 and 60 miles above the Earth.
The UARS will have two opportunities to study winters in the northern hemisphere and
one opportunity to study the Antarctic ozone hole during the satellite's 20-month life.
The UARS is the first major flight element of NASA's Mission to Planet Earth, a multi-
year global research program.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document that
is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and Mission
Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space Shuttle
flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a change,
or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk factors
impacting the STS-48 flight were also documented prior to the STS-48 Flight Readiness
Review (FRR) (FRR Edition) and the STS-48 Launch Minus Two-Day (L-2) Review
(L-2 Edition). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety risk
factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-2 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION !
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to the
Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-48 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that are unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I for
discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern will not be reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length
and found not to be a concern will be reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues are considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-48 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-48 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-48
flight.
Section 4 - Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-48.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (WAs) that developed
during the STS-43 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-39
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter Vehicle (OV-104).
Section 7 Contains a list of WAs that developed during the STS-48
mission. Those WAs that are considered to represent a safety
risk will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains presentation
data, white papers, and other documentation. These data were
used to support the resolution rationale or retention of open
status for each item discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-48MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-48Mission
Space Shuttle Discovery was launched into a 57-degree inclination orbit from the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Launch Complex 39A at 6:11 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time
(EDT) on September 12, 1991. Launch was delayed for 14 minutes at the T-5 minute
mark due to a noise problem in the air-to-ground link. The noise cleared itself, and the
countdown proceeded normally to launch.
On Flight Day (FD) 3, the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) was
deployed from Discovery's payload bay 350 statute miles above Earth to study mankind's
effect on the planet's atmosphere and its shielding ozone layer. The UARS mission
objectives are to provide an increased understanding of the energy input into the upper
atmosphere, global photochemistry of the upper atmosphere, dynamics of the upper
atmosphere, the coupling among these processes, and the coupling between the upper
and lower atmosphere. This will provide data for a coordinated study of the structure,
chemistry, energy balance, and physical action of the Earth's middle atmosphere - that
slice of air between 10 and 60 miles above the Earth. The UARS will have two
opportunities to study winters in the northern hemisphere and one opportunity to study
the Antarctic ozone hole during the sateUite's 20-month life. The UARS is the first
major flight element of NASA's Mission to Planet Earth, a multi-year global research
program that will use ground-based, airborne, and space-based instruments to study the
Earth as a complete environmental system.
Operation of all systems was generally satisfactory during the 5-day mission.
However, several problems were encountered during the STS-48 flight. During External
Tank (ET) umbilical door closing, the forward ET door centerline latch motor failed to
draw current on phase B. This did not affect ET door closure since each centerline latch
has 2 redundant motors and the latch actuators will operate satisfactorily with only 1
good motor (3 good phases). During the second supply water dump on FD 2, the dump
nozzle temperature dropped from 150°F to 98°F. The dump nozzle displayed the same
type of erratic heater temperature characteristics as seen on STS-39. The dump line was
subsequently purged to clear any water and prevent freezing, and was isolated by closing
the dump line isolation valve. On FD 5, during the fifth supply water dump, an unusual
heating cycle for the dump nozzles was noted. The nozzle heaters were left on following
this dump in order to bake out the nozzles. There were indications that ice was possibly
forming in the dump line. The most probable source for ice formation is leakage from
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the dump valve. If the dump nozzle were to be ruled failed, excess water could be
dumped into the Flash Evaporator System first, with a second alternative of utilizing the
wastewater clump line via the water contingency crosstie (Flight Rule 9-919). On FD4, a
7-second Reaction Control System (RCS) bum was performed to avoid a "spent" upper
stage booster that was in the general area of the Orbiter flight path. This collision
avoidance maneuver resulted in a small change in Discovery's orbit to 308 x 302 nautical
mile. On FD 6, the hydraulic system #2 circulation pump was activated by a hydraulic
line temperature sensor. The pump circulates hydraulic fluid through the heat exchanger
to keep the fluid temperature above the low limit of 0°F. At the completion of the
circulation pump cycle, the accumulator exhibited a pressure decay of 155 pounds per
square inch per hour (psi/hour). This was attributed to a known contamination from the
accumulator resulting in a small leak in the unloader valve. During Flight Control
System checkout, the unloader valve seat was flushed of contamination via hydraulic
pressure supplied by the Amdliary Power Unit; the decay rate decreased to 24 psi/hour,
which was within the allowable limit of
48 psi/hour.
STS-48 was the second mission since return-to-flight to have KSC as the planned
End-Of-Mission (EOM) landing site, and the first mission to have a planned night
landing at KSC. However, due to weather conditions at KSC in Florida, Discovery flew
one extra orbit and landed at Edwards Air Force Base, California, at 3:38 a.m. EDT on
September 18, 1991.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
• Launch Date: September 12, 1991
• Launch Time: 6:11 p.m. EDT
• Launch Site: KSC Pad 39A
• RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Shuttle Landing Facility
• TAL Site: Zaragosa, Spain
• Alternate TAL Site: Moron, Spain; Ben Guerier, Morocco
Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Runway 22
Landing Date: September 18, 1991
Landing Time: 3:38 a.m. EDT
Mission Duration: 5 Days, 9 Hours, 27 Minutes
Crew Size: 5
Inclination: 57.0 °
Altitude: 293 Nautical Miles/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-103 (13)Discovery
ET-42
SRBs: BI-046
RSRM Flight Set #18
MLP #3
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ENGINE #2019 #2031 #2107
POWERHEAD #2020 #2028 #2014
MCC* #2023 #2019 #4002
NOZZLE #2024 #4017 #4016
CONTROLLER F4 F29 F25
FASCOS* #23 #12 #29
HPFTP ° #5203R 1 #2323R2 #6003R 1
LPFTP* #2022R1 #2120R 1 #4007
HPOTP* #2424R4 #2226R4 #4305R 1
LPOTP* #2025R 1 #2120 #2216
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.3 Miscellaneous Items of Interest for the STS-48 Mission.
['|armed End-Of-Mission Return to Kennedy_ Space Center. STS-48/OV-103 was the
second mission since return to flight to have KSC as the planned EOM landing site. It
was the first mission, however, to have a planned night landing at KSC. STS-43/OV-104,
the first mission to have a planned return to KSC, landed safely on August 11, I991.
The extensive deliberation which preceded the decision to land STS-43 at KSC resulted
in the determination that for missions with EOM vehicle weights less than or equal to
205,000 pounds (lb), KSC would be designated at the primary EOM landing site; for
EOM vehicle weights greater than 205,000 lb, Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) would
be the primary landing site. STS-48/OV-103 EOM vehicle weight was less than 205,000
lb (192,267 lb). In making the decision to return to KSC as a primary landing site,
revised landing wind constraints were established:
For vehicle weight less than or equal to 205,000 lb, crosswind limit is less
than or equal to 12 knots.
For vehicle weight greater than 205,000 lb (when EAFB is unavailable),
crosswind limit is less than or equal to 10 knots.
• Peak winds, regardless of direction, must be less than or equal to 20 knots.
The lower landing weight and wind restrictions provide increased tire wear safety
margin when landing at KSC.
New Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Failure Mode Identified. A new accepted risk
hazard report, RMSX0067026, addressing the RMS was presented to the System Safety
Review Panel (SSRP) on August 14, 1991. The hazardous condition was identified as an
RMS failure condition that could cause a single-joint runaway of the RMS while parked
with the brakes on. This condition would result in damage to the UARS payload, RMS,
and/or Orbiter. A mishap could occur as a result of an unamaunciated failure (short) of
1 transistor in the direct drive circuitry of the RMS, and a second unarmunciated RMS
failure (short) of 1 of the 2 transistors in the direct drive brake release/command
circuitry. The subsequent failure would cause the brake to be removed and result in a
failed joint running away at direct drive rates. Direct drive rates would cause damage to
the STS-48 payload/UARS solar arrays. Annunciation of the second failure (audible
alarm and caution/warning light) occurs when the brake slip routine detects joint
movement greater than 0.05 degrees while the brakes are commanded on; however, the
brake slip routine cannot stop the single-joint runaway, and collision of the payload with
the RMS or Orbiter is possible. The potential resulting damage to the RMS could
render it immobile and prevent stowage of the arm. Jettison of the RMS would become
necessary if severely damaged. Damage to the UARS could result in loss of mission.
UARS impact with the Orbiter structure may prevent payload bay door closure or cause
other catastrophic structural damage.
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The primary controls for uncommanded RMS motion are FMEA/CIL 2860, Flight
Rule (FR) 12-2, and crew action to remove primary power to the RMS. Crew response
is the only control to stop and prevent a collision if this failure were to occur. Nominally
under FR 12-2, during crew sleep periods and during extended periods of non-RMS
operation, the RMS is cradled, latched, and the system is left in the temperature
monitoring mode. During non-sleep periods, the RMS may be left unattended if the
conditions of the FR are met. For STS-48, mission-specific flight rules were approved
that modified Flight Rule 12-2 and allowed for unattended overnight parking. This
approved modification to FR 12-2 would be invoked as a contingency action in the event
that UARS deployment was not completed prior to the end of the crew work day.
The crew established that they could respond to an alarm within 15 seconds during
the crew awake periods and within60 seconds for crew asleep periods, and prevent the
payload/UARS from colliding with the Orbiter. Clearance analysis showed that if these
failures occurred, UARS would not collide with the Orbiter within 60 seconds. The crew
was informed of this failure case and the proper response of powering down the RMS.
Elimination of Cadmium Plating on the Solid Rocket Motor Safe and Am1 Gasket
v
Retainers. Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) SRM-2418
was implemented on STS-48 for the first time. ECP SRM-2418 eliminates the cadmium
plating on the safe and arm gasket retainer. This change was implemented to eliminate
the potential for cadmium-induced embritflement of surrounding hardware. A corrosion
preventative grease, HD-2, was applied to the gasket retainer and replaced the cadmium
plating. HD-2 is certified for use in other, non-cadmium-plated steel gaskets in the
SRM. Eliminating the cadmium plating does not affect the fit or function of the gaskets.
New ManiDulator Controller Interface Unit (MCIU) ConfiLmration. The RMS was used
on STS-48 to deploy the UARS. A new-configuration MCIU, MCIU-5, was used for the
first time with the RMS and replaced the MCIU-3 configuration. Modifications made to
the MCIU-3 configuration to achieve the MC1U-5 configuration include: eliminating
14 Criticality 1/1 failure modes, replacing obsolete parts, improving fault detection
capabilities, and replacing autosafing with autobrakes (MCIU-3 had both autosafing and
autobraking). Two MCIUs were manifested on STS-48:1 operational and 1 spare. The
suggestion was made to manifest an MCIU-3 unit as the spare for STS-48; however,
additional crew training and equipment would have been required to support this action.
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First Flight of Enhanced Multiplexer-Demultiplexer (EMDM). STS-48 was the first
flight to employ an EMDM. Only 1 EMDM was installed in OV-103, in the
Operational-Instrumentation Aft #1 (OA-1) position. Multiplexer-Demultiplexers
(MDMs) and EMDMs are designed to be functionally equivalent and can be used in a
mixed set. Benefits gained in the EMDM over the current MDM include: parts
reduction by using gate arrays (MDMs use hybrid circuits for digital logic); incorporation
of a power supply for each Input/Output Module (IOM) (MDMs have 1 power supply
for all IOMs); enhanced power supply Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE); and a design
modification to eliminate an IOM mismapping single-point failure [the MDM has a
single-point failure that allows the Sequence Control Unit (SCU) to command multiple
IOMs; the EMDM prevents wrong IOM selection by the SCU].
Potentii_l for Tile Slumping Aft of the Nose Cap on STS-48/OV-103. Postflight
inspection of OV-103 after STS-39 (the last mission) identified areas of slumped tile aft
of the nose cap. This is the area where the other Orbiters have the Reinforced Carbon-
Carbon Chin Panel installed in place of tiles. Similar damage was witnessed on
STS-26/OV-103. Because STS-48 had a high-inclination mission profile (57 °, same as
STS-39), similar aeroheating was expected, and the potential for similar tile slumping
existed. Plans are to replace tiles in this area with the chin panel during the OV-103
major modification period after STS-42.
New Nose Landing Gear (NLG) Tires. STS-48/OV-103 was the first flight with the new
NLG tires, MC194-0007-0006. This new configuration replaces the -0002 NLG tires
previously used. Changes incorporated in the -0006 tires include; a commercial tire
inner liner compound to provide a lower leak rate; a new filling gum between ply layers
to improve layer adhesion; new rubber, instead of scrap, in the sidewall compound for
improved ozone resistance; an ozone protective coating replacing the final finish paint;
and increased overlap of tread and sidewall rubber to avoid folds during production.
Concern was raised over the introduction of these tires into the fleet prior to completion
of the -0006 certification program. Certification testing was completed on August 8,
1991 at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, but test results were not yet reviewed by the
Orbiter Project and Rockwell International. However, no certification test anomalies
were reported. The test tire was pre-rolled prior to testing; NLG tires installed on
STS-48/OV-103 were not pre-rolled prior to installation. Analysis determined that pre-
roll and shearography are not considered mandatory for flight. Coordination is underway
to complete the review of the certification test results and approve the -0006 tires for
flight. A Quality Site Approval was effected to enable use of the -0006 NLG tires for
STS-48 and STS-44, and to allow orderly completion of the tire certification process.
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Potcntio.l for First Use of Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update (DOLILU). The DOLILU
system is used on the day of launch to determine and verify pitch and yaw 1-Loads. The
1-Loads are used in the measured day-of-launch environment to enhance Space Shuttle
safety, performance, and launch probability. Use of undetected incorrect 1-Loads could
lead to a catastrophic event. The Space Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) has authorized implementation of DOLILU capability for the purpose of
compensating for off-nominal environmental effects. Assessments of 1-Loads are
independently performed at Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Rockwell/Downey.
A new Integration Hazard Report, INTG-180: Loss of Vehicle Due to Mis-
Evaluation of I-Loads and Uplink of Incorrect I-Loads, was processed through the Space
Shuttle SSRP on August 13, 1991, and was subsequently reviewed and approved by the
Level II PRCB on August 15, 1991 (subject to completion of open work items).
INTG-180 is a Controlled hazard, with flight effectivity of STS-48 and subs. Open work
closure date was specified as the STS-48 Flight Readiness Review (FRR).
Another feature of the use of DOLILU is the capability for real-time presentation
of the DOLILU trajectory on the Range Safety Display System. However, recent testing
determined that the Range Safety Display System apparently has a software coding error
which does not allow automated import of DOLILU. A corrective action plan was
established which indicates this problem will not be corrected until December 1991. For
STS-48, the Range Safety Officer was provided with facsimile copies of the DOLILU
trajectories in a similar manner as near-real-time wind data is provided. The loss of this
feature does not adversely impact the Range Safety Officer in the performance of his
required duties.
The Safety and Mission Quality community expressed reservations concerning the
use of DOI./LU until additional analysis results were available. It was suggested that the
standard I-Loads continue to be implemented on STS-48, with DOLILU initially being
performed in parallel for comparison and analysis purposes only.
2.4 Payload Data
The highlight of Space Shuttle mission STS-48 was the deployment of the Upper
Atmosphere Research Satellite. The UARS is the first major flight element of NASA's
Mission to Planet Earth, a multi-year global research program that will use
ground-based, airborne, and space-based instnmaents to study the Earth as a complete
environmental system. Mission to Planet Earth is NASA's contribution to the U.S.
Global Change Research Program, a multi-agency effort to better understand, analyze,
and predict the effects of human activity on the Earth's environment.
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Small nuclear sources for the UARS and the Shuttle Activation Monitor (SAM)
were reviewed and approved by the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP)
and appropriately reported to Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and
Technology Policy. There was no significant threat to crew health by the presence of
these sources.
Payload Bay:
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) -- the observatory consists of
a standard design Multi-mission Modular Spacecraft (MMS), coupled to an
lmtnunent Module (IM) that includes 10 imtruments/seusors. The MMS
Hydrazine Propulsion Module will power orbit adjustment maneuvers for the
initial boost to orbit and maintain the required altitude. The system consists
of four 5-pound thrusters and 12 small 0.2-pound attitude control thrusters.
The Modular Attitude Control System (MAC'S) is a three-axis system of
sensors contained within the MMS that tells the UARS where it is pointed
and actuators that can point the spacecraft as required. The entire
observatory was designed to permit its retrieval and return to Earth by a
Space Shuttle crew if required.
Ascent Particle Monitor (APM) -- collects particulate materials from the
Orbiter in thepayload bay during the immediate prelaunch period and
ascent, using an automated mechanical/electrical assembly.
Middeck:
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) Calibration Test -- is an electro-optical
facility that tracks the Orbiter and records signatures from thruster firings,
water dumps, or the phenomena of Shuttle glow (caused by the interaction of
atomic oxygen with the spacecraft). The data is used to calibrate the infrared
and optical sensors at the facility. No hardware onboard the Shuttle is
needed for the system.
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM) --is designed to
collect data on cosmic ray energy loss spectra, neutron fluxes, and induced
radioactivity. The data will be collected by an active cosmic ray monitor and
a passive sodium iodide detector, and up to five passive detector packages,
that are placed at specific locations throughout the Orbiter cabin. CREAM
data will be obtained from the same locations that will be used to gather data
for the Shuttle Activation Monitor experiment in an attempt to correlate data
between these two units.
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Investigation into Polymer Membranes Processing (IPMP) --will investigate
the physical and chem/cal processes that occur during the formation of
polymer membranes in microgravity to improve the knowledge base that can
be applied to commercial membrane processing techniques. The STS-48
mission will provide additional data on the polymer precipitation process.
Middeck Zero-Gravity Dynamics Experiment (MODE) -- will study
mechanical and fluid behavior of components for Space Station Freedom and
other future spacecraft and is one of the more complex experiments ever to
be tested in the Orbiter's middeck cabin area. On orbit, the astronauts
command the computer via a keypad to execute test routines stored on the
optical recorder before launch. Once a test routine begins, the computer and
associated control circuits energize the containers or the truss with precisely
controlled forces and then measure the response. The four fluid test articles
are Lexan cylinders - two containing silicon oil which has dynamic properties
that approximate those of typical spacecraft fluid propellants and two
containing water. The structural test article is a truss model of part of a
large space structure. Four different truss configurations are slated for
testing: (1) the basic truss will be evaluated which is an in-line combination
of truss sections, with an erectable module flanked by deployable modules
mounted on either end; (2) a rotary joint, similar to the Space Station
Freedom "alpha joint" that will govern the orientation of the Station's solar
arrays, will replace the erectable section; (3) an L-shaped combination of a
deployable truss, rotary joint and erectable module (all mounted in-line), and
another deployable section mounted at a 90-degree angle to the end of the
erectable truss; and (4) the final configuration that mounts a flexible
appendage simulating a solar panel or a solar dynamic module to the elbow
of the L-shaped third configuration.
Physiological and Anatomical Rodent Experiment (PARE) -- is the first in a
series of experiments designed to determine whether exposure to microgravity
results in physiological or anatomical changes in rodents. The PARE-01
experiment examines changes caused by exposure to microgravity in
anti-gravity muscles (those used for movement) and in tissues not involved in
movement. The objectives of this flight experiment are to determine whether
microgravity affects insulin control of glucose transport in an anti-gravity
muscle (the soleus); to confirm that in microgravity, non-load-bearing tissues
(the heart, liver and adipose tissue) store additional amounts of glycogen as a
result of altered regulation of glucose metabolism; and to provide the first
data regarding changes in muscle mass and protein content in developing
mammals exposed to microgravity.
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Protein Crystal Growth-H (PCG-II) -- is a continuing series of experiments to
demonstrate the techniques to produce large, high-quality crystals by a vapor-
diffusion process at room temperature (22°C). Growth of relatively large and
highly-ordered protein crystals reduces the time required to determine
protein molecular structures by x-ray diffraction and computer modeling.
Sixty different protein crystal growth experiments will be conducted
simultaneously.
Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME-III) -- measures ionizing radiation
exposure to the crew within the Orbiter cabin. RME-rn measures gamma
ray, electron, neutron and proton radiation and calculates, in real time,
exposure in RADS-tissue equivalent. RME-III will be activated by the crew
as soon as possible after reaching orbit and will be operated throughout the
mission.
Shuttle Activation Monitor (SAM) -- is designed to measure gamma ray data
within the Orbiter as a function of time and location in the middeck.
Electronic Still Camera (ESC) -- is a hand-held, self-contained digital camera,
and is the first model in a planned evolutionary development leading to a
family of high-resolution digital-imaging devices. The digital image is stored
on removable hard disks or small optical disks, and can be converted to a
format suitable for downfink transmission or enhanced using image-
processing software. During STS-48, the ESC was used to image areas of
interest to commercial remote sensing users. Scenes of Earth, such as major
cities and geological formations, will be used to compare the ESC to other
Earth-looking sensors. Images of Shuttle crew member tasks in the middeck
and payload bay were taken to test the camera's use for documentation and
mission support.
2,5 Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) Description
NASA's UARS is an Earth-orbiting observatory that will carry out the first
systematic, comprehensive study of the stratosphere and furnish important new data on
the mesosphere and thermosphere. The UARS mission is the most complex space
investigation of the upper atmosphere ever attempted. The UARS will operate 600 km
above the Earth in an orbit inclined 57 degrees to the Equator. This orbit will permit
the UARS sensors to "see" up to 80 degrees in latitude - thus providing essentially global
coverage of the stratosphere and mesosphere - and to make measurements over the full
range of local times at all geographic locations every 36 days. UARS will have two
opportunities to study winters in the northern hemisphere and one opportunity to study
the Antarctic ozone hole during the sateUite's planned 20-month life.
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The UARS mission objectives are to provide an increased understanding of:
energy input into the upper atmosphere, global photochemistry of the upper atmosphere,
dynamics of the upper atmosphere, the coupling among these processes, and the coupling
between the upper and lower atmosphere. An important product of these studies will be
computer models that simulate processes in the upper atmosphere. These simulations
will test our understanding of these processes and provide predictions of changes in
atmospheric structure and behavior important to future policy formulation.
Three types of measurements will be carried out: (1) composition and
temperature, (2) winds, and (3) energy inputs. The data sets from these measurements
will yield the first simultaneous, comprehensive, global coverage of these closely-coupled
atmospheric properties. A tenth instrument [Active Cavity Radiometer H (ACRIM II) is
not technically part of the UARS mission], devoted to measurements of total solar
irradiance (the "solar constant"), was also carried to extend a data set of importance to
global climate studies.
Atmospheric Comvosition and Temperature
Four UARS sensors will make global measurements of the vertical distributions of
ozone, methane, water vapor, and other minor species involved in the chemistry of the
ozone layer. In addition, two of these sensors will derive atmospheric temperature
profiles through observations of infrared radiation emitted by carbon dioxide, which is
assumed to be well mixed throughout the atmosphere.
The Cryogenic Limb Array Etalon Spectrometer (CLAES) will determine
concentrations of members of the nitrogen and chlorine families, as well as
ozone, water vapor, methane, and carbon dioxide, through observations of
infrared thermal emissions at wavelengths from 3.5 to 12.7 microns. The
CLAES utilizes a telescope, a spectrometer, and a linear array of 20
detectors to make simultaneous measurements at 20 altitudes ranging from
10 to 60 km.
The Improved Stratospheric and Mesospheric Sounder (ISAMS) experiment
will measure the concentrations of nitrogen chemical species, as well as
ozone, water vapor, methane, and carbon monoxide, through observations in
the infrared spectral region from 4.6 to 16.6 microns. The ISAMS, a filter
radiometer, observes infrared molecular emissions by means of a movable
off-axis reflecting telescope. The telescope can also be commanded to view
regions to either side of the UARS observatory, thus providing increased
geographic coverage.
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The Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) will measure emissions of chlorine
monoxide, hydrogen peroxide, water vapor, and ozone in the microwave
spectral region at frequencies of 63, 183, and 205 GI-tz (i.e., wavelengths of
4.8, 1.64, and 1.46 ram). The observations of chlorine monoxide are of
particular importance, since this gas is a key reactant in the chorine chemical
cycle that destroys ozone; microwave measurements are essential for
observations of this species.
The Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE) will determine the vertical
distributions of hydrofluoric and hydrochloric adds as well as those of
methane, carbon dioxide, ozone, water vapor, and members of the nitrogen
family. During every UARS orbit, at times of spacecraft sunrise and sunset,
the HAI_E will be pointed toward the Sun to measure the absorption of
energy along this line of sight. There are 28 solar occultation opportunities
per day, providing data for 14 different longitudes in each of the Northern
and Southern Hemispheres.
Atmospheric Winds
The UARS mission will provide the first direct, global-scale measurements of the
horizontal wind field in the upper atmosphere. The two other UARS instruments, a
High Resolution Doppler Imager (HRDI) and a Wind Imaging Interferometer
(WINDII), will provide direct observations of wind velocity through measurements of the
doppler shifts of selected emission and absorption lines. These doppler shifts will be
measured in two different directions, yielding two components of the wind velocity
relative to the spacecraft; the true wind velocity can then be calculated.
At altitudes below about 45 kin, the HRDI will observe the doppler shifts of
spectral lines within the atmospheric band system of molecular oxygen to
determine the wind field. The oxygen bands contain many lines that appear
as deep absorption features in the brilliant spectrum of scattered sunlight.
The HRDI will exploit these daytime absorption features to provide wind
data for the stratosphere and upper troposphere to an accuracy of 5 m/see or
better. At altitudes above about 60 km, the HRDI will observe emission
lines of neutral and ionized atomic oxygen in the visible and near-infrared
spectral regions. The emission lines are observable both day and night.
These measurements will furnish the wind field in the mesosphere and
thermosphere to an accuracy of 15 m/see or better.
The WINDII utilizes emission lines for the basic doppler-shift measurements.
In addition to lines of neutral and ionized atomic oxygen, these include two
lines of the OH molecule and a molecular-oxygen line. The WlNDII will
obtain measurements both day and night at altitudes above 80 km.
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The upper atmosphere receives energy from the Sun via two sources: ultraviolet
radiation and magnetospheric charged particles. The UARS observation program will
provide the measurements necessary for determining the net effect of the solar energy
inputs on the amount and distribution of ozone in the stratosphere.
The Solar Ultraviolet Spectral lrradiance Monitor (SUSIM), mounted on the
UARS solar/stellar positioning platform, will measure solar ultraviolet
radiation in the wavelength range from 120 to 400 nanometers (rim) with a
resolution down to 0.1 nm. The instrument is designed to provide its own
long-term, absolute calibration fight sources to track any change in instrument
response during spaceflight.
The Solar/Stellar L,'radiance Comparison Experiment (SOLSTICE) will
measure solar ultraviolet radiation in the wavelength range from 115 to 430
nm with a resolution of 0.12 nm. This instalment has the unique ability to
compare the solar ultraviolet output with the ultraviolet radiation of stable
bright blue stars, using the same optics. The SOLSTICE will be pointed
toward the Sun during the daylight portion of each orbit, and toward one of
the calibration stars during most of the nighttime portion of the orbit.
The Particle Environment Monitor (PEM) instrument will determine the
type, amount, energy, and distribution of charged particles injected into the
Earth's thermosphere, mesosphere, and stratosphere. The PEM will utilize
three separate boom-mounted sensors to measure electrons with energies
from 1 eV to 5 MeV, protons with energies from 1 eV to 150 MeV, and the
strength of the Earth's magnetic field - all in the vicinity of the spacecraft.
The PEM will include a 16-element array of x-ray detectors to provide wide
spatial coverage of the energy injected into the upper atmosphere by high-
energy electrons.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-48 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-48 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, and 6), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-48 flight (see Section 7). The list
indicates the section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item
is addressed, the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description
of the item, and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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Section 6:
Orbiter 5
ITEM
STS-39 Inflight Anomalies
Supply water dump nozzle
temperature drop.
COMMENT
On the STS-39 flight, approximately 20
minutes (min) into supply water
dump #5, the water dump nozzle
temperature rapidly decreased 30"F,
from 163" F to 133"F, over a 14-rain
period (IFA No. STS-39-V-08). Nozzle
temperatures normally remain around
170" F. After this period, the nozzle
temperature recovered to normal. With
the supply water dump valve closed
prior to a subsequent dump, a rapid
5" F drop in nozzle temperature was
observed. Nozzle heaters were "on"
when this event occurred. Review of
data from the last 2 OV-103 flights
indicated that the nozzle temperatures
rose while heaters were "on" and the
supply water dump valve was closed. At
no time was the supply water dump
function inhibited by fluctuations in
nozzle temperature during STS-39.
Postflight troubleshooting at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) was unsuccessful in
reproducing this anomaly; it was
considered to be caused by a transient
effect. A hi-level discrete was added to
the nozzle telemetry to monitor power
to the nozzle heaters on subsequent
flights.
On STS-48, during supply water
dump #2, the power discrete remained
"on" while the nozzle temperatures were
erratic, an indication of a problem in
the nozzle heater circuitry. During the
2 post-bakeout periods following supply
dt.mps #4 and #5, the supply water line
and nozzle temperatures indicated water
leakage past the dump valve (IFA No.
STS-48-V-04). The crew performed a
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Section 6:
Orbiter 5
(Continued)
ITEM
STS-39 lnflight Angmalics
Supply water dump nozzle
temperature drop.
COMMENT
purge procedure on the line to clear any
water and prevent freezing of the line,
dump valve, and dump nozzle. After
successful purge of any free water, the
line was isolated by closing the dump
line isolation valve. KSC performed a
post-STS-48 walkdown inspection and
leak check prior to removal and
replacement of the dump valve, line,
and nozzle. The removed units were
sent to JSC for analysis.
Failure to melt ice in the dump nozzle
would prevent the use of the primary
supply water dump method (a Crit 1R3
condition). However, excess supply
water could be dumped into the Flash
Evaporator System or the wastewater
dump line could be utilized via the
waste water contingency crosstie (Flight
Rule 9-919).
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-48 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-48. These items were reviewed by the NASA Safety Community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to rationale for flight is based on findings
resulting from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP), Prelaunch Assessment Review
(PAR), and Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) evaluations (or other special
panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety assessment arrived at in accordance with
actions taken, efforts conducted, and tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve
each specific problem.
Hazard Reports (HRs)associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the risk factor rifle. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the risk
factor, or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-48 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
RISK
FACTOR
INTEGRATION
External Tank 17-inch Liquid Hydrogen disconnect, Serial
Number 1217, failed Liquid Hydrogen screen test.
ORBITER
1
2
4
5
6
7
Main Propulsion System cryogenic temperature transducer failure.
Generic power supply problem in the new General Purpose
Computers, AP-101S.
Avionics software discrepancy provides the potential for an undetected
failure of a Space Shuttle Main Engine controller channel.
Contamination found in STS-48/OV-103 Main Propulsion System.
Master Event Controller preflight Built-In-Test Equipment errors.
Inter-Process Variable anomaly found in Backup Flight Software.
STS-48/OV-103 Right-Hand Reaction Control System Gaseous
Helium regulator leakage.
SSME
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Undetected cold wall coolant tube leaks.
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump #2222 turbine stator vane crack.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump thrust ball cracks.
Low-pressure oxidizer duet flex joint bellows life issue.
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump #5602R1 failure on engine #0215
during ground test.
Space Shuttle Main Engine controller F24 Digital Computer Unit "B"
memory alteration issue.
STS-48/OV-103 Main Engine 2 Main Oxidizer Valve Actuator
failures.
PAGE
4-4
4-8
4-12
4-15
4-18
4-20
4-22
4-24
4-26
4-28
4-30
4-32
4-34
4-36
4-38
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ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS..48 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
SRM
1
2
Nozzle fixed housing, joint #5 secondary seal integrity issue.
Test Evaluation Motor-8 forward segment propellant stress relief flap
erosion.
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SECTION 5
STS-43 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-43/OV-104 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
The following risk factor in this section represents a low-to-moderate increase in
risk above the Level I approved Hazard Baseline. The NASA Safety Community
assessed the relative risk increase of each and determined that the associated increase
was acceptable.
Orbiter 5 Contamination and leakage of the Liquid Hydrogen 4-inch
disconnect.
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SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-43 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO. ANOMALY PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Water Spray Boiler #2 did not provide lube oil cooling on ascent.
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Hydrogen tank #1, heater
"B" failed off.
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution Hydrogen manifold # 1
isolation valve failed to dose.
Auxiliary Power Unit #1, Serial Number 305, anomalous Gas
Generator chamber pressure during entry.
Contamination and leakage of the Liquid Hydrogen 4-inch disconnect.
Right-hand outboard brake pressure was low.
STS-43/OV-104 Main Propulsion System Liquid Oxygen bleed/check
valve failure.
5-3
5-5
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-15
5-17
SSME
1 Space Shuttle Main Engine #3 controller Digital Computer Unit
failure on channel "A".
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SECTION 6
STS-39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-39/OV-103 mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle. Each anomaly is
briefly described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in this section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {AR} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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STS.39 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ANOMALY PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Flash Evaporator System feedline "A", system #2, heater failure.
Auxifiary Power Unit #2 Fuel Pump/Gas Generator Valve Module
coolant system "A" valve did not open.
Reaction Control System vernier thruster F5R fuel injector
temperature biased low.
Operations recorder #2 uncommanded configuration before launch
[potential Multiplexer-Demultiplexer hybrid circuit failure].
Supply water dump nozzle temperature drop.
Auxiliary Power Unit #2 lube oil outlet pressure was low.
Right-Hand outboard Main Landing Gear tire excessive wear.
Loss of communications during entry.
The Pilot's Rotational Hand Controller bottomed-out during entry.
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SECTION 7
STS-48 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-48/OV-103 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described.
Hazard Reports (HRs) associated with each risk factor in t_s section are listed
beneath the anomaly title. Where there is no baselined HR associated with the anomaly,
or if the associated HR has been eliminated, none is listed. Hazard closure
classification, either Accepted Risk {A_R} or Controlled {C}, is included for each HR
listed.
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STS-48 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
RISK
FACTOR PAGE
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Smoke detector false alarms.
External Tank umbilical door centerline latch drive motor #2 phase B
current low.
Fuel cell 1# Oxygen reactant valve "closed" indication.
Supply water dump valve leakage.
Hydraulic system #2 unloader valve leakage.
Forward Reaction Control System manifold isolation valve operating
on 2 of 3 phases.
Extraneous body flap motion.
SRB
1
2
Left-Hand frustum upper Right-Hand Booster Separation Motor
aeroheat shield cover missing.
Right-Hand lower strut black mark.
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors and
anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to provide
more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AP
ACRIM II
AFB
ALCA
AMOS
amp
AOA
APM
APU
AR
ATO
ATP
BFS
BITE
BSM
Btu
C
CA
CB
CG
CLAES
CPU
CREAM
CRT
DAR
DC
DCU
DEU
DOLILU
DR
Delta Pressure
Active Cavity Radiometer II
Air Force Base
Aft Load Controller Assembly
Air Force Maui Optical Site
Ampere
Abort-Once-Around
Ascent Particle Monitor
Auxiliary Power Unit
Accepted Risk
Abort-To-Orbit
Acceptance Test Program
Backup Hight Software
Built-In-Test Equipment
Booster Separation Motor
British Thermal Unit
Controlled
California
Circuit Breaker
Center of Gravity
Cryogenic Limb Array Etalon Spectrometer
Central Processing Unit
Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor
Cathode Ray Tube
Deviation Approval Request
Direct Current
Digital Computer Unit
Display Electronics Unit
Day-Of-Launch I-Load Update
Discrepancy Report
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
EAFB
ECP
EDM
EDT
EIU
EMDM
EOM
ESC
ET
FASCOS
FCS
FD
FES
FID
FMEA
FMEA/CIL
FOS
FF
FPOV
FR
FRCS
FRR
FRT
ft
GG
GGVM
GHe
GPC
n 2
HALOE
HCF
HPFTP
HPM
HPOTP
HR
hr
Edwards Air Force Base
Engineering Change Proposal
Electrical Discharge Machining
Eastern Daylight Time
Engine Interface Unit
Enhanced Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
End-Of-Mission
Electronic Still Camera
External Tank
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Flight Control System
Flight Day
Flash Evaporator System
Failure Identification
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Factor of Safety
Fuel Pump
Fuel Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Flight Rule
Forward Reaction Control System
Flight Readiness Review
Flight Readiness Testing
Feet
Gas Generator
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Helium
Gaseous Nitrogen
General Purpose Computer
Hydrogen
Halogen Occultation Experiment
High-Cycle Fatigue
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High Performance Motor
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hazard Report
Hour
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HRDI
HSD
IBM
IFA
IM
INSRP
INTG
IOM
IPMP
IPV
ISAMS
W&V
JSC
KSC
lb
Ibm
LCC
LD
LH
LH2
LO 2
LPFTP
LPOTP
LSFR
L-2
MACS
MAF
MCC
MCDS
MCF
MCIU
MDM
ME-2
MEC
MECO
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
High Resolution Doppler Imager
Horizontal Situation Display
International Business Machines
Inflight Anomaly
Instrument Module
Interageney Nuclear Safety Review Panel
Integration
Input/Output Module
Investigation into Polymer Membranes Processing
Inter-Process Variable
Improved Stratospheric and Mesospheric Sounder
Independent Verification and Validation
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Pound
Pounds-Mass
Launch Commit Criteria
Leak Detector
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Site Flow Review
Launch Minus 2 Day
Modular Attitude Control System
Michoud Assembly Facility
Main Combustion Chamber
Multifunctional CRT Display System
Major Component Failure
Manipulator Controller Interface Unit
Multiplexer-Demultiplexer
Main Engine 2
Master Events Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
MFV
MIA
MIM
rain
MLG
MLP
MLS
MM602
MMS
MMT
MODE-0
MOV
MOVA
MPS
MPTA
MSE
MUM
NASA
NBR
NLG
NSI
NSRS
02
OA-1
OMRSD
OPOV
OPS
ORBI
OSMQ
OV
P/N
PAR
PARE
PASS
PCG
Main Fuel Valve
Multiplexer Interface Adapter
MCDS Input Module
Minute
Main Landing Gear
Mobile Launch Platform
Microwave Limb Sounder
Major Mode 602
Multi-mission Modular Spacecraft
Mission Management Team
Middeck 0-Gravity Dynamics Ex-periment
Main Oxidizer Valve
Main Oxidizer Valve Actuator
Main Propulsion System
Main Propulsion Test Article
Mission Safety Evaluation
MCDS Update Module
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nitrite Butadiene Rubber
Nose Landing Gear
Nanometer
NASA Standard Initiator
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Operational-Instrumentation Aft #1
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve
operational Sequence
Operations
Orbiter
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Orbiter Vehicle
Part Number
Prelaunch Assessment Review
Physiological and Anatomical Rodent Experiment
Primary Avionics System Software
Protein Crystal Growth
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
PCV
PEM
PF2
POR
ppm
PR
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psi/hr
psia
psig
PSIG
RCS
RDVT
RH
RHC
RME
RMS
RPC
RSRM
RTLS
RTV
S/N
SAM
scch
SCCS
scfm
scim
SCU
sec
SLF
SMS
SOLSTICE
SOV
SR&QA
SRB
SRM
Pulse Control Valve
Particle Environment Monitor
Payload Forward 2
Power-On Reset
Parts Per Million
Problem Reports
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds Per Square Inch Per Hour
Pounds Per Square Inch Absolute
Pounds Per Square Inch Gage
Propulsion Systems Integration Group
Reaction Control System
Rotary Variable Differential Transducer
Right-Hand
Rotational Hand ControLler
Radiation Monitoring Equipment
Remote Manipulator System
Remote Power Controller
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Return to Launch Site
Room-Temperature Vulcanizing
Serial Number
Shuttle Activation Monitor
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Hour
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Standard Cubic Inches Per Minute
Sequence Control Unit
Second
Shuttle Landing Facility
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Soiar/Stellar Irradiance Comparison Experiment
Shutoff Valve
Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
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LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
SSC
SSME
SSRP
SUSIM
TAEM
TAL
TDRS
TDRSS
TEM-8
UARS
VDT
WINDH
WSB
Stennis Space Center
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Solar Ultraviolet Spectral Irradiance Monitor
Terminal Area Energy Management
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System
Test Evaluation Motor 8
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite
Vehicle Data Table
Wind Imaging Interferometer
Water Spray Boiler
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